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Trial Delay Caused by Discrete Systemwide Events: The Post-Jordan Era Meets 
the Age of COVID-19 
Abstract 
Court closures necessitated by COVID-19 have resulted in extensive trial delay, with implications for the 
section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time. Although COVID-19 appears to be a 
straightforward example of an “exceptional circumstance” under the Jordan framework that governs 
section 11(b), careful analysis reveals that it falls within a category not contemplated by that 
framework—what this article calls “discrete systemwide events.” Because COVID delay impacts cases 
across the system, the reasonable steps that can be taken to reduce it are themselves largely systemic in 
nature. Crucially, the exceptional circumstances analysis stipulated by Jordan focuses exclusively on the 
steps available in an individual case, while systemic delay is addressed indirectly through presumptive 
ceilings. Because the presumptive ceilings were not calibrated with COVID-19 in mind, they cannot 
account for COVID delay. Nor can systemic responses to COVID delay be assessed as part of the general 
exceptional circumstances analysis: Such an approach would require judges to adjudicate the 
reasonableness of myriad institutional policies, giving rise to problems ranging from a lack of data to 
separation of powers issues. This conundrum points towards one of two extremes: discount COVID delay 
without a full Jordan analysis, thereby partially relieving the Crown of its burden to justify presumptively 
unreasonable delay and leaving accused persons to bear the cost; or effectively prevent Crowns from 
justifying COVID delay as an exceptional circumstance, thereby risking thousands of stayed criminal 
charges flowing from the pandemic. This article suggests an alternative approach that navigates between 
these extremes: In some instances, delay caused by a discrete systemwide event like COVID-19 should be 
remedied by a sentencing reduction, authorized either by the Charter or by the sentencing process set out 
in the Criminal Code. This solution, while imperfect, achieves a more palatable result while adding 
minimal complexity to the section 11(b) analysis. If adopted, it could save accused persons from 
disproportionately bearing the costs of COVID delay, which would be the likely outcome were the Jordan 
framework applied straightforwardly. 
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol57/iss3/10 
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Trial Delay Caused by Discrete 
Systemwide Events: The Post-Jordan 
Era Meets the Age of COVID-19 
PALMA PACIOCCO* 
Court closures necessitated by COVID-19 have resulted in extensive trial delay, with 
implications for the section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time. Although 
COVID-19 appears to be a straightforward example of an “exceptional circumstance” under 
the Jordan framework that governs section 11(b), careful analysis reveals that it falls within a 
category not contemplated by that framework—what this article calls “discrete systemwide 
events.” Because COVID delay impacts cases across the system, the reasonable steps that 
can be taken to reduce it are themselves largely systemic in nature. Crucially, the exceptional 
circumstances analysis stipulated by Jordan focuses exclusively on the steps available in an 
individual case, while systemic delay is addressed indirectly through presumptive ceilings. 
Because the presumptive ceilings were not calibrated with COVID-19 in mind, they cannot 
account for COVID delay. Nor can systemic responses to COVID delay be assessed as part 
of the general exceptional circumstances analysis: Such an approach would require judges 
to adjudicate the reasonableness of myriad institutional policies, giving rise to problems 
ranging from a lack of data to separation of powers issues. This conundrum points towards 
one of two extremes: discount COVID delay without a full Jordan analysis, thereby partially 
relieving the Crown of its burden to justify presumptively unreasonable delay and leaving 
accused persons to bear the cost; or effectively prevent Crowns from justifying COVID delay 
as an exceptional circumstance, thereby risking thousands of stayed criminal charges 
flowing from the pandemic. This article suggests an alternative approach that navigates 
between these extremes: In some instances, delay caused by a discrete systemwide 
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event like COVID-19 should be remedied by a sentencing reduction, authorized either by 
the Charter or by the sentencing process set out in the Criminal Code. This solution, while 
imperfect, achieves a more palatable result while adding minimal complexity to the section 
11(b) analysis. If adopted, it could save accused persons from disproportionately bearing the 
costs of COVID delay, which would be the likely outcome were the Jordan framework applied 
straightforwardly. 
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IN THE SUMMER OF 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada radically revised 
the framework for assessing claims under section 11(b) of the Charter, which 
guarantees accused persons the right “to be tried within a reasonable time.”1 
Decrying “the culture of delay and complacency” that had come to characterize our 
criminal justice system, the majority in R v Jordan established a new section 11(b) 
framework and urged all criminal justice system actors to recommit themselves to 
delivering timely trials.2 Te doctrinal change was dramatic enough that courts 
and legal commentators soon began demarcating the “pre-Jordan era” and the 
“post-Jordan era.”3 Less than four years into the post-Jordan era, in March 2020, 
the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic, 
and courts across Canada closed to slow its spread. Te imperative of ensuring 
timely trials yielded to the necessity of promoting public health. Te post-Jordan 
era met the age of COVID-19. 
As of this writing, criminal courts have begun to reopen but are not yet at 
full capacity. As courts reopen, they face dockets congested with older cases that 
were delayed by court closures, plus a backlog of newer cases initiated during 
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 11(b), Part I of Te Constitution Act, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 [Charter]. 
2. R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 29 [Jordan]. 
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or after the closure periods. Some of the accused persons squeezing through the 
resulting bottleneck have been languishing in pretrial detention at a time when 
jail conditions are more dangerous and desperate than usual.4 Others have been 
released pending trial. For some of them, material conditions—such as curfews 
or home confnement—may actually have been relatively similar to those 
experienced by members of the general public under social distancing orders; 
but the emotional, social, and fnancial stresses associated with pending criminal 
charges, and the psychological and economic strain caused by COVID-19, 
are likely to be mutually exacerbating. Meanwhile, victims, witnesses, and the 
many family and community networks impacted by criminal prosecutions 
have been enduring an extended period of anticipation at a time when stress is 
already running high, and when access to support and fellowship is restricted. 
Furthermore, many of those who are disproportionately likely to be prosecuted 
for crimes, or to be victims of crime, are also likely to be among those hit hardest 
by COVID-19. Tis is so because people from equity-seeking groups—those who 
are economically marginalized, racialized, Indigenous, disabled, LGBTQ2S+, 
street-involved, engaged in sex work, and/or experiencing addiction or other 
forms of mental ill-health—tend to be disproportionately impacted by crime 
and the criminal justice system5 and by public health emergencies, including 
4. Amanda Jerome, “Bail, sentencing impacted as jail could be ‘death sentence’ during 
pandemic, lawyer says,” Te Lawyer’s Daily (15 May 2020), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/ 
articles/19059/bail-sentencing-impacted-as-jail-could-be-death-sentence-during-pandemic-
lawyer-says> [perma.cc/7HH6-M7VE]. 
5. See e.g. Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to 
the Present (Fernwood Publishing, 2017); Jonathan Rudin, “Aboriginal Peoples and the 
Criminal Justice System” (2005) (Research Paper Commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry), 
online (pdf ): Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ 
inquiries/ipperwash/policy_part/research/pdf/Rudin.pdf> [perma.cc/D4DY-MMWF]; 
Terry Skolnik, “Homelessness and Unconstitutional Discrimination” 15 JL & Equality 
69 at 72-73, 79; Statistics Canada, Violent victimization of lesbians, gays and bisexuals in 
Canada, 2014, by Laura Simpson, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Catalogue No 
85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 31 May 2018), online: Statistics Canada <www150. 
statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54923-eng.htm> [perma.cc/SN5Q-NQP9]; 
Kyle Kirkup, Relations Between Police and LGBTQ2S+ Communities (Independent Civilian 
Review into Missing Persons Investigations, 2020), online (pdf ): <8e5a70b5-92aa-40ae-
a0bd-e885453ee64c.flesusr.com/ugd/681ae0_1d67158e1b824d21a1450dbcdebbc435.pdf> 
[perma.cc/P4FK-Z2ZD]. 






COVID-19.6 In short, then, as they reopen, our criminal courts face a massive 
backlog, and the human stakes are extraordinarily high. 
In this unprecedented situation, how should courts approach section 11(b) 
claims relating to trial delay caused by COVID-19? (In what follows, this type of 
delay is referred to by the shorthand “COVID delay.”) Te most obvious response 
is that COVID delay constitutes an “exceptional circumstance” under the Jordan 
framework, and as such should be subtracted from the total period of delay that 
is counted for section 11(b) purposes. Yet, a closer look at the section 11(b) 
jurisprudence reveals that this straightforward response is problematic. Under the 
Jordan framework, delay can only be deducted as an “exceptional circumstance” 
if the Crown can satisfy a two prong test: (1) it must show that the circumstance 
causing the delay was reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable; and (2) 
it must show that, once this circumstance arose, the Crown and the criminal 
justice system could not reasonably have remedied the resulting delay. Ordinarily, 
this second prong focuses on the particular actions that were taken, or ought 
to have been taken, in the case at hand; it does not involve a broader analysis 
of systemic eforts to limit trial delay. Systemic delay is addressed indirectly, 
through the application of numerical ceilings above which delay is presumptively 
unreasonable: Once other aspects of the Jordan analysis are factored in, the 
assessment of whether the ceiling was breached in a given case functions as a sort 
of proxy for evaluating systemic delay. 
COVID delay is unique. It results from an exceptional circumstance, but a 
pervasive one that impacts cases across the system. Accordingly, the reasonable 
steps that can be taken to limit COVID delay must themselves be largely 
6. See e.g. Kwame McKenzie, “Anti-racism legislation needed to ensure equitable public 
health response,” Toronto Star (25 June 2020), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/ 
contributors/2020/06/25/anti-racism-legislation-needed-to-ensure-equitable-public-health-
responses.html> [perma.cc/4D8D-ZZGR]; Kaitlin Curice & Esther Choo, “Indigenous 
populations: left behind in the COVID-19 response” (6-12 June 2020), online: Elsevier 
Public Health Emergency Collection <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7272170> 
[perma.cc/ABC3-FEAL]; Bridget M Kuehn, “Homeless Shelters Face High COVID-19 
Risks,” JAMA Network (9 June 2020), DOI: <10.1001/jama.2020.8854>; John P Salerno, 
Natasha D Williams & Karina A Gattamorta, “LGBTQ Populations: Psychologically 
Vulnerable Communities in the COVID-19 Pandemic” (2020) 12 Psychological 
Trauma: Teory, Research, Pract, Pol’y 239 (advance online publication), DOI: <dx.doi. 
org/10.1037/tra0000837>; Lucy Platt et al, “Sex workers must not be forgotten in the 
COVID-19 response” (2020) 396 Lancet 9, online: <www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/ 
article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31033-3/fulltext> [perma.cc/A6UJ-WZYG]; Te Agenda 
with Steve Paikin, “Demanding Disability Rights Amid COVID-19,” (8 May 2020), 
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systemic in nature. Tey may include, for example, more strenuous charge 
screening protocols to reduce global caseloads, and procedural and technological 
innovations to enable remote proceedings. If the Jordan framework is to be 
respected in substance and not merely in form, then both prongs of the analysis 
must be meaningfully assessed whenever the Crown claims COVID delay is an 
exceptional circumstance. Te analysis must include an assessment of whether 
the Crown and the criminal justice system took reasonable steps to mitigate 
the delay. Otherwise, Crowns would be informally relieved of their burden to 
show that presumptively unreasonable delay truly qualifes as an exceptional 
circumstance. Concretely, this would mean that, even if Crowns and other 
criminal justice actors collectively failed to take very obvious, important steps to 
move trials along, resulting in presumptively unreasonable delay, accused persons 
would be made to bear the resulting harms, contrary to the design and purpose 
of the Jordan framework and of the section 11(b) Charter right itself. 
Yet, as I will explain, there are signifcant problems with attempting to 
evaluate the reasonableness of institutional responses to COVID delay. Quite 
simply, systemic mitigation eforts cannot be meaningfully assessed within the 
Jordan framework. Tere are overwhelming problems associated with asking 
judges to scrutinize institutional responses to COVID-19 when adjudicating 
individual section 11(b) claims, ranging from a lack of data to separation of powers 
considerations. Further, there is no mechanism for assessing these responses 
indirectly, since the presumptive ceilings that normally serve this function were 
not calibrated with an event like the COVID-19 pandemic in mind. Nor would 
it do to simply vary those ceilings: For reasons that are elaborated below, we could 
not establish a principled standard for assessing the COVID delay that accrued 
before the new ceilings were introduced. In short, the Jordan framework cannot 
work as intended without a direct or indirect analysis of systemic delay, and it 
cannot accommodate an analysis of systemic delay in the COVID context. 
One could, of course, take the position that if the Crown cannot discharge 
its burden to justify presumptively unreasonable delay—for whatever reason— 
then the section 11(b) claim must succeed. Te trouble with this position is 
that it has been determined that section 11(b) violations can only be remedied 
by stays of proceedings, and the prospect of staying criminal charges across the 
country because of delay attributable to the pandemic is so anathema as to make 
this response nonviable. 
What is required, then, is a creative, practical approach to redressing 
COVID delay; one that navigates between the extremes of requiring either too 
much or too little attention to institutional responses, and that is both consistent 









with the existing Jordan framework and sensitive to current material realities. 
My aim in this article is to propose such an approach. Concretely, I suggest that, 
in some instances, COVID delay should attract a diferent remedy—specifcally, 
a sentencing reduction—as an alternative to either staying cases across the board 
or insisting that the delay is justifed based on an anemic Jordan analysis. Te 
proposed solution is a compromise, and as such is imperfect. It has the merit, 
however, of attaining a more nuanced result than the Jordan framework could 
achieve while adding relatively little complexity to the analysis. More importantly, 
if adopted, it could save accused persons from almost unilaterally bearing the 
costs of COVID delay, which would be the likely result were Jordan applied 
straightforwardly. 
Te remainder of the article unfolds as follows. Part I illustrates how 
COVID-19 is causing delay and introduces some of the institutional responses 
that have been adopted thus far. Part II sketches out the Jordan framework and 
explains why this framework cannot account for COVID delay. To that end, 
it proposes a refnement of the exceptional circumstances typology introduced 
in Jordan. Te Jordan Court recognized that exceptional circumstances will 
normally apply in two types of cases: “particularly complex cases,” which require 
more time because of their intrinsic complexity; and cases delayed by “discrete 
events,” i.e., by extrinsic occurrences. I propose that there are, in fact, two types 
of “discrete events”: case-specifc events, the impacts of which are confned to a 
single case (or to a very small number of cases); and systemwide events, which 
massively disrupt the criminal justice system and result in trial delay across large 
swaths of cases. When we consider the exceptional circumstances analysis in 
light of this distinction, we see that the “discrete events” category recognized 
by the Jordan Court is better characterized as “discrete case-specifc events.” Te 
other category—“discrete systemwide events”—has yet to be recognized by the 
jurisprudence. Te distinction matters because the discrete systemwide events 
category is not amenable to analysis under the usual Jordan framework, for reasons 
that are detailed below. COVID delay falls within the “discrete systemwide 
events” category. As such, COVID delay cannot be satisfactorily addressed using 
the existing Jordan framework. It requires an alternative analysis. Part III proposes 
such an analysis, suggesting that delay attributable to “discrete systemwide 
events”—including COVID delay—should attract a sentencing reduction under 
some circumstances. Part III explains, further, that this sentencing reduction 
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by the sentencing regime set out in the Criminal Code, as interpreted by the 
Court in R v Nasogaluak.7 Part IV concludes. 
I. TRIAL DELAY RESULTING FROM COVID-19 
In early 2020, courts across Canada confronted the threat of COVID-19.8 Te 
following montage is far from exhaustive, but it is illustrative. In mid-March, 
the Provincial Court of Nova Scotia announced it was adjourning some criminal 
matters until June;9 the New Brunswick Provincial Court postponed trials for 
out-of-custody accused;10 and the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador 
limited operations and rescheduled court dates for non-urgent out-of-custody 
cases.11 Te Prince Edward Island Supreme Court likewise suspended regular 
operations. It started conducting case management conference calls again in May, 
and it resumed other pre-trial proceedings and criminal trials in mid-June.12 
Te Supreme Court of British Columbia suspended regular operations 
efective March 19, adjourning most criminal matters until June and cancelling 
7. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]; R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 
6 [Nasogaluak]. 
8. Elizabeth Raymer, “Courts across Canada restrict access or suspend operations due to 
COVID-19,” Canadian Lawyer (16 March 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag. 
com/news/general/courts-across-canada-restrict-access-or-suspend-operations-due-to-
covid-19/327534> [perma.cc/9L24-7LRS]. 
9. See Executive Ofce of the Nova Scotia Judiciary, “COVID-19: Measures Applicable to the 
Provincial Court of Nova Scotia” (16 March 2020), online (pdf ): Te Courts of Nova Scotia 
<www.courts.ns.ca/News_of_Courts/documents/NSPC_Measures_03_16_20.pdf> [perma. 
cc/8624-L9GW]; Executive Ofce of the Nova Scotia Judiciary, “COVID-19: Further 
Restrictions in Provincial Courts” (18 March 2020), online (pdf ): Te Courts of Nova Scotia 
<www.courts.ns.ca/News_of_Courts/documents/COVID_Prov_Court_Update_03_18_20. 
pdf> [perma.cc/R64N-DXZ7]. 
10. “Measures Applicable to the Provincial Court of New Brunswick: Notice to the Media, 
Justice Participants and the Public” (1 June 2020), online (pdf ): Law Society of New 
Brunswick <www.lawsociety-barreau.nb.ca/fles/Public/COVID-19%20-%20NOTICE%20 
EFFECTIVE%20JUNE%201ST%202020.pdf> [perma.cc/7QAE-JKF8]. 
11. Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, “COVID-19 Court Scheduling for the 
Period March 16, 2020 to May 22, 2020, Inclusive” (17 March 2020), online (pdf ): <court. 
nl.ca/provincial/COVID-19_Operational_Plan-Provincial_Court.pdf>. 
12. “Prince Edward Island Courts–COVID-19 Impacts” (2 July 2020), online: Government of 
Prince Edward Island <www.princeedwardisland.ca/en/information/justice-and-public-safety/ 
prince-edward-island-courts-covid-19-impacts> [perma.cc/6VK4-2EJL]. 










jury selections until September.13 Te Alberta Provincial Court adjourned all 
non-urgent matters, except for in-custody criminal matters, from March 17 to 
May 22.14 Te Provincial Court of Manitoba suspended circuit court sittings and 
out-of-custody proceedings from mid-March until the end of May.15 Te Court 
of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan postponed all jury trials set to commence 
between March 16 and May 30 and adjourned all trials for out-of-custody 
accused from March 20 to May 31.16 
In the Northwest Territories, criminal proceedings scheduled for the period of 
March 16 to July 6 were adjourned for all accused persons outside of Yellowknife, 
and for out-of-custody accused in Yellowknife.17 Te Territorial Court of Yukon 
suspended circuit travel in mid-March and adjourned all out-of-custody circuit 
matters;18 it resumed in-person hearings in Whitehorse on July 6.19 Te Nunavut 
13. Supreme Court of British Columbia, “Notice to the Profession, the Public and the Media 
Regarding Criminal Proceedings: COVID-19: Expansion of Court Operations” (7 July 
2020), online (pdf ): Te Courts of British Columbia <www.bccourts.ca/supreme_court/ 
documents/COVID-19_Notice_No.33_Expansion_of_Court_Operations_Criminal_ 
Proceedings_July_7_2020.pdf> [perma.cc/ZLA7-7CLP]. 
14. Provincial Court of Alberta, “COVID-19 Staged Resumption of Court Operations–Part 
1” (19 May 2020), online: Alberta Courts <www.albertacourts.ca/docs/default-source/ 
pc/covid-19-staged-resumption-of-court-operations---part-1.pdf?sfvrsn=42c9780_4> 
[perma.cc/A3AF-DE2V]; Provincial Court of Alberta, “COVID-19 Staged Resumption 
Party 2 – July 6” online: Alberta Courts <www.albertacourts.ca/pc/resources/covid> 
[perma.cc/U23T-T629]. 
15. Provincial Court of Manitoba, “Notice Re: COVID-19 Suspension and Re-Opening of 
Some Courts” (15 May 2020), online (pdf ): Manitoba Courts <www.manitobacourts. 
mb.ca/site/assets/fles/1966/notice_-_provincial_court_-_covid-19_-_reopening_courts_ 
may_15_2020_-_e.pdf> [perma.cc/9YJF-6PE8]. 
16. Courts of Saskatchewan Communications Ofce, “Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan 
Directive and Advisory” (19 March 2020), online (pdf ): <sasklawcourts.ca/images/ 
documents/Queens_Bench/COVID_Update_3_19.pdf> [perma.cc/7FUV-W9H4]. 
17. Courts of the Northwest Territories, “Territorial Court Directive on COVID 19” (last 
modifed 6 July 2020), online: Northwest Territories Courts <www.nwtcourts.ca/en/ 
nwt-courts-response-to-covid-19> [perma.cc/N8DM-QVS3] 
18. Territorial Court of Yukon, “Announcement” (17 March 2020), online (pdf ): Yukon Courts 
<yukoncourts.ca/sites/default/fles/2020-06/covid_19_tc_announcement_mar_17_2020. 
pdf> [perma.cc/2W9D-HP5P]. 
19. Territorial Court of Yukon, “Notice to the Profession and the Public” (19 June 2020), online 
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Court of Justice suspended regular operations on March 16, later extending the 
closure until July 3.20 
Te Ontario Court of Justice adjourned all criminal court appearances 
involving out-of-custody accused from March 16 to July 3, and it subsequently 
extended the adjournment of criminal case management appearances until July 
31.21 Te Cour du Québec suspended regular operations on March 13, with a 
gradual reopening beginning June 1.22 Te Chief Justice of the Superior Court 
of Québec, which likewise suspended operations, estimated that, in mid-May, 
his court “was losing 1,000 judge days per month (i.e., the number of days that 
judges are sitting on the bench).”23 When we consider all the court closures and 
service reductions across Canada, only some of which are recounted here, the 
total loss of court days is staggering. 
When court closures went into efect, various criminal justice actors took 
steps to move cases forward using virtual or telephone formats where possible, 
albeit with varying levels of attention and alacrity. Yet, while these technologies 
help to reduce trial delay, they cannot eliminate it. Virtual criminal trials and 
preliminary hearings pose special challenges, given the accused’s statutory right 
to be present in court for all indictable matters where evidence is being taken,24 
and in light of the fact that our system privileges live witness testimony. Jury 
20. Emma Tranter, “Nunavut court will face backlog when they reopen, says deputy minister,” 
Nunatsiaq News (11 May 2020), online: <nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/90376> [perma. 
cc/P84S-S6FH]; Nunavut Court of Justice, “Memo: Nunavut Court of Justice operations 
update in response to Coronavirus (COVID-19): Resumption of limited In-Person Court 
(IPC) criminal proceedings” (27 March 2020), online (pdf ): Nunavut Courts <www. 
nunavutcourts.ca/images/phocadownload/Memo_to_Bar_Re_Resumption_of_In-person_ 
Court_in_Iqaluit_NCJ_May_27_2020_Pub.pdf> [perma.cc/6FRF-CXLZ]. 
21. Ontario Court of Justice, “COVID-19: Notice to Counsel and the Public re: Criminal 
Matters in the Ontario Court of Justice” (2 July 2020), online: Ontario Courts <www. 
ontariocourts.ca/ocj/covid-19/covid-19-criminal-matters> [perma.cc/8HZM-GXED]. 
22. Cour du Québec, “Gradual Resumption of Court of Québec Services Beginning June 
1, 2020, in light of the COVID-19 Health Crisis,” online (pdf ): Te Courts of Québec 
<www.tribunaux.qc.ca/c-quebec/codiv19/Covid19_Resumption_Province_en.pdf> 
[perma.cc/C8E8-YPXR]. 
23. Elizabeth Raymer, “Quebec Superior Court chief justice highlights court administration 




24. Criminal Code, supra note 7, s 650. 











trials, in particular, are uniquely challenging.25 Virtual proceedings of all kinds 
also pose accessibility issues. Among other things, not all participants can access 
the computer technology and high-speed internet necessary to engage in remote 
proceedings.26 Accessibility is a particularly acute problem for accused persons 
held on remand, who may have no computer access.27 Tere are also accessibility 
concerns for persons with disabilities, who may encounter barriers if technologies 
are not designed and utilized with due attention to inclusivity.28 With these 
important caveats in mind, virtual criminal trials can work in appropriate 
circumstances.29 But, again, they can only do so much to reduce delay. 
Even the reopening of criminal courts has had a limited efect on trial delay. 
Courts cannot return to full capacity during the pandemic. As of this writing, 
staggered reopenings are being enabled by physical and procedural changes 
to promote health and safety, such as the erection of plexiglass barriers in 
courthouses.30 Tese changes take time to implement, and some existing spaces 
may be too small to allow for physical distancing. Reopenings have therefore 
been partial. For example, the Provincial Court of British Columbia announced 
it was reopening a total of forty in-person trial courtrooms in June.31 In Ontario, 
when trial courts reopened on July 6, 147 courtrooms were operational across 
25. For an analysis of the challenges and possibilities associated with virtual jury trials, see Ken 
Broda-Bahm, “Online Trials: Expect Both Challenges and Opportunities” (29 June 2020), 
online: Lexology <www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=359fbe3e-6e15-4100-88e9-
d38bb913484c> [perma.cc/LC9S-MGJX]. 
26. See Te Agenda with Steve Paikin, “Removing Barriers to Justice in Ontario” (26 May 2020), 
online (video): TVO <www.tvo.org/video/removing-barriers-to-justice-in-ontario> [perma. 
cc/DM7F-HAYZ]. Criminal defence attorney Annamaria Enenajor has observed that virtual 
court proceedings are “very dependent on privileged access to technology” and are therefore 
less accessible to people who are economically disadvantaged, a disproportionate percentage 
of whom are racialized (ibid). 
27. See e.g. R v Vickerson, 2020 ONCA 434. 
28. See e.g. Alaina Leary, “How to Make Your Virtual Meetings and Events Accessible to the 
Disabled Community” (12 April 2020), online (blog): Rooted in Rights <rootedinrights.org/ 
how-to-make-your-virtual-meetings-and-events-accessible-to-the-disability-community> 
[perma.cc/2TE9-4NCY]. 
29. See e.g. In Re: Court File No. 19/578, 2020 ONSC 3870. 
30. Te Canadian Press, “Ontario courts to resume some in person proceedings today,” Law 
Times (6 July 2020), online: <www.lawtimesnews.com/business-news/ontario-courts-to-
resume-some-in-person-proceedings-today/331202> [perma.cc/DZ5T-2974] [“Ontario 
courts to resume”]. 
31. “Message from the Chief Judge: How the BC Provincial Court has met the challenges 
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forty-four locations (which was two short of the planned 149 courtrooms), and 
the stated goal was to have all Ontario courtrooms operational by November 1.32 
Even if a case is now set to go forward in a reconfgured courtroom, there 
are new barriers. Some participants may not be able to travel for hearings due to 
the pandemic. Others may be unable to enter courthouses if they fail required 
COVID-19 screenings,33 whether because they are genuinely experiencing 
symptoms, or because they are purporting to be symptomatic in a bid to avoid 
participating. Te result is that some trials may need to be rescheduled if one or 
more participants is unable to attend. When section 11(b) claims arise in the 
context of such cases, courts will have to decide how to characterize that delay. 
In sum, the implications of COVID-19 for section 11(b) rights across the 
country are as obvious as they are concerning. What is less obvious is how to 
respond. Te starting point, of course, is the Jordan framework that governs 
section 11(b). I turn to that framework now. 
II. THE CHALLENGE OF ASSESSING COVID DELAY UNDER 
THE JORDAN FRAMEWORK 
A. THE JORDAN FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING TRIAL DELAY 
Section 11(b) of the Charter guarantees that, once a person has been charged 
with a crime, the state will act reasonably to ensure that person will not be made 
to endure an unreasonably long wait before the charge is resolved. Tis right to 
reasonable state action in avoiding excessive trial delay is understood to implicate 
the accused’s liberty interests, since trial delay prolongs the period during which 
the accused is held in pre-trial custody or under release conditions; their security 
of the person, because trial delay exacerbates the stigma and anxiety associated 
with unresolved criminal charges; and their fair trial interests, since delay can 
make it harder to mount an efective defence as evidence deteriorates or is lost.34 
Te Jordan majority made clear that unreasonable trial delay is irrebuttably 
prejudicial to accused persons. When it occurs, the remedy that issues through 
section 24(1) of the Charter is a stay of proceedings.35 
Section 11(b) claims are now adjudicated using the framework set out in 
Jordan. First, the total period of delay is calculated. Tat period begins when 
the accused is charged, and it runs until the actual or projected end of trial, 
32. Ibid. See also “Ontario courts to resume,” supra note 30. 
33. See e.g. “Ontario courts to resume,” supra note 30. 
34. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 20. 
35. R v Rahey, [1987] 1 SCR 588 [Rahey]. See also Jordan, supra note 2 at para 35. 
















defned as the end of evidence and argument.36 Te total period excludes any 
delay that is unequivocally waived by the defence or caused solely by defence 
actions not “legitimately taken to respond to the charges.”37 Trial delay is 
presumptively unreasonable if it surpasses eighteen months for cases tried before 
the provincial court, or thirty months for cases tried in superior court or in 
provincial court following a preliminary inquiry. Te Jordan majority explained 
that, while prejudice to the accused is no longer expressly assessed under the 
section 11(b) framework as it was in the pre-Jordan era, “it informs the setting of 
the presumptive ceiling. Once the ceiling is breached, we presume that accused 
persons will have sufered prejudice to their Charter-protected liberty, security of 
the person, and fair trial interests.”38 
If the ceiling is breached, the Crown must rebut the presumption of 
unreasonableness by showing that the delay would have been below-ceiling but 
for “exceptional circumstances”: circumstances that “lie outside the Crown’s control
in the sense that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, 
and (2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from 
those circumstances once they arise.”39 Tese two defning features operate as two 
prongs of the inquiry.40 First, the Crown must demonstrate that the precipitating 
event was reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable; then, it must show that it “took 
reasonable steps in an attempt to avoid the delay.”41 Applying the second prong 
of the test in R v KJM, the Court frst considered whether the Crown could 
have taken reasonable steps, then went on to consider whether “the justice system” 
could have done so.42 Tus, when assessing whether presumptively unreasonable 
delay is justifed by an exceptional circumstance, we should consider whether 
that delay could have been mitigated by reasonable steps available to the Crown 
or the criminal justice system; in other words, the state agents who administer the 
prosecution of ofences. Tese agents are not held to a “standard of perfection,” 
nor must the Crown show “that the steps it took were ultimately successful.”43 
36. R v KGK, 2020 SCC 7 [R v KGK]. 
37. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 65. 
38. Ibid at para 54. 
39. Ibid at para 69 [emphasis in original]. 
40. R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 at paras 58-59. 
41. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 70. 
42. R v KJM, 2019 SCC 55 at paras 101-102 [emphasis in original] [R v KJM]. Te dissenting 
justices endorsed this aspect of the analysis and would have applied it even more stringently 
by concluding, contra the majority, that some of the complained-of delay in that case was 
attributable to errors by criminal justice ofcials other than the Crown and should therefore 
have been included in the calculus of net delay. 
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Exceptional circumstances generally take one of two forms. Te frst is 
“discrete events” such as medical emergencies. Delay attributable to discrete 
events is subtracted from the total period, which is then reassessed against the 
ceiling. Te second form is particularly complex cases, i.e., cases that properly 
require an inordinate amount of time to prepare and/or try, given the nature of 
the evidence or the issues. If a case is particularly complex, then the judge may 
fnd the total period of delay is reasonable on a qualitative standard, even if it is 
above the ceiling. 
If the ceiling is not breached, then the delay is presumptively reasonable, 
and the onus falls on the defence to show otherwise. To do so, the defence must 
establish, frst, that it “took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained efort 
to expedite the proceedings”; and second, that “the case took markedly longer 
than it reasonably should have” in light of such factors as the case’s complexity, 
local considerations, and the Crown’s eforts to expedite the proceedings.44 
Finally, when it introduced this framework, the Jordan majority established 
standards for cases already in the system. It instructed courts to take a fair 
approach to assessing below-ceiling delay accrued in the pre-Jordan era, bearing in 
mind that the previous section 11(b) jurisprudence did not expressly require the 
defence to “demonstrate a sustained efort to expedite.” For above-ceiling cases, “a 
transitional exceptional circumstance” could apply if the delay was justifed based 
on the parties’ reasonable reliance on pre-Jordan standards, or if it was attributable 
to institutional delay problems that would take time to remedy post-Jordan. Te 
majority made it extremely clear, however, that it expected all stakeholders to take 
meaningful steps to reduce trial delay: Signifcant institutional delay problems 
could potentially justify lengthy delay for cases already in the system when Jordan
was issued, but they could not go unaddressed for long. 
Te judgment stressed that chronic institutional delay is unacceptable, and 
that all criminal justice system participants must engage in sustained, cooperative 
eforts to promote timely trials.45 Tis message continues to resonate in the 
post-Jordan era.46 
44. Ibid at para 82. 
45. Ibid at paras 5, 81, 112-17. 
46. See R v Tanabalasingham, 2020 SCC 18 at para 9 [Tanabalasingham]. 








B. APPLYING THE TWO-PRONG EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
ANALYSIS TO COVID DELAY 
How does COVID delay ft into the Jordan framework, if at all? Te most obvious 
answer is that COVID-19 is an exceptional circumstance. Yet, while this answer 
may be obvious, it is not unproblematic. Te problem becomes apparent when 
we consider how the two-prong exceptional circumstances analysis would apply 
to COVID delay. Once again, the frst prong addresses whether the circumstance 
giving rise to the delay was reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and 
the second prong asks whether the Crown and the criminal justice system took 
reasonable steps to avoid the delay. 
1. THE FIRST PRONG: THE DELAY IS REASONABLY UNFORESEEN OR 
REASONABLY UNAVOIDABLE 
Te frst prong of the analysis is relatively straightforward. COVID-19-related 
court closures were “reasonably unforeseen,” at least at the outset. At a certain 
point, of course, they were planned and publicized, and hence not unforeseen; 
but even then, they remained “reasonably unavoidable.” Tat having been 
said, COVID-19 difers from other circumstances that have been recognized 
as “reasonably unforeseen” or “reasonably unavoidable” to date, inasmuch as 
it is a systemwide occurrence. While this diference is not per se problematic 
for purposes of the frst prong of the analysis, it is worth unpacking, since it 
enhances the conceptual clarity of the argument that follows with respect to 
the second prong. 
As we have seen, exceptional circumstances generally fall under one of two 
categories—discrete events, and particularly complex cases—although the Jordan 
majority afrmed that “[t]he list is not closed.”47 Te “particularly complex cases” 
category is of minimal relevance here. It applies to cases that take an unusually 
long time to try due to the complexity of the evidence or the issues before the 
court. Tese are the cases that would surpass the presumptive ceilings, even 
if the parties were to act with reasonable alacrity and the system were to run 
reasonably smoothly. In other words, these are the cases that should take longer. 
For particularly complex cases, the circumstance resulting in the delay is not 
unforeseen, but it is unavoidable since it is intrinsic to the case. Tere will, 
of course, be particularly complex cases that are impacted by COVID-19, but 
the category itself is not applicable to COVID delay: COVID-19 does not render 
cases more complex in substantive or evidentiary terms. 
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Te “discrete events” category is more germane; but ultimately, it too is not 
readily applicable to COVID delay. Discrete events that have been recognized to 
date are one-of occurrences that stymy the progress of a specifc case, and which 
are unforeseen and/or unavoidable. Examples include: late-breaking disclosure; 48 
an unavoidable change of defence counsel; 49 a mistrial resulting from the elevation 
of the trial judge to a higher court; 50 a medical issue necessitating rescheduling;51 
an administrative error to do with a transcript request unrelated to the Crown; 
52 a complainant’s failure to appear; 53 and an unplanned power outage.54 In each 
of these scenarios, the delay resulted from an isolated event, not a systemic 
one.55 Indeed, these “discrete events” can be referred to with greater precision as 
“discrete case-specifc events”; i.e., discrete events that occurred in the context of 
a particular case (or perhaps a very small subset of cases—picture, for example, 
a blackout that delays a number of cases in a single courthouse on a given day). 
Tey can be contrasted with “discrete systemwide events”; i.e., extrinsic events 
that are systemwide in their scope and impact, such as COVID-19. Discrete 
systemwide events have not been taken up by the section 11(b) jurisprudence 
to date, and they present a special challenge. Tis is so because, while discrete 
systemwide events satisfy the frst prong of the exceptional circumstances analysis, 
they pose a unique problem when it comes to applying the second prong. 
48. R v Live Nation Canada Inc, 2017 ONCJ 590 [Live Nation]. 
49. R v Jackson, 2017 ONSC 5925 [Jackson]. In some situations, delay arising out of a change of 
counsel may be deducted as “defence delay.” See Jordan, supra note 2 at para 193. 
50. Live Nation, supra note 48. 
51. R v Côté, 2019 ONCJ 87; Jackson, supra note 49. 
52. R v KJM, supra note 42. 
53. R v Francis, 2019 ONCJ 173. 
54. R v Herman, 2019 SKPC 31. 
55. Te category has also been applied to a delay caused by the accused’s extradition to Canada. 
See Jordan, supra note 2 at paras 72, 81. Here, courts distinguish delay resulting from the 
Crown’s failure to act expeditiously (which is not justifed); delay resulting from the accused’s 
attempts to avoid extradition (which constitutes defence delay); and delay genuinely 
required to achieve extradition (which is the only type counted as a discrete event). See 
R v Prince, 2018 ONSC 3033 at para 34. Inasmuch as delay associated with extradition 
proceedings fows directly from the nature of those proceedings, it is arguably more akin 
to “particularly complex cases” than to “discrete events” (ibid at para 15, citing R v Coulter, 
2016 ONCA 704). It is nevertheless treated as a discrete event, presumably because it is 
plainly time-limited and easily measured, which means it is best accounted for through the 
quantitative analysis associated with the discrete events category, as opposed to the qualitative 
analysis used for particularly complex cases. Delay resulting from COVID-19 may likewise 
be quantifable and time-limited. But, unlike delay associated with extradition, it does not 
fow directly and inevitably from the nature of the proceedings themselves; it is an extrinsic 
problem, to be reasonably managed. 







2. THE SECOND PRONG: REASONABLE STEPS TAKEN TO AVOID 
THE DELAY 
To make the point concrete, consider the kinds of responses various criminal 
justice actors are taking, or could be taking, to reduce COVID delay. Te 
most important strategy available to Crowns is robust charge screening. Te 
conscientious, coordinated use of prosecutorial discretion to dispense with 
low-priority cases is a key strategy for reducing wait times: By vigorously 
screening cases and dismissing minor and/or dubious charges outright, Crown 
attorneys can conserve limited time and resources for higher-priority cases.56 For 
the balance of cases, Crowns can prefer diversion whenever possible; and they can 
encourage swift resolution where appropriate by staking out fair and transparent 
settlement positions, and by accepting defence-favourable positions whenever it 
is reasonable for them to do so.57 Collaborative resolution discussions undertaken 
in a spirit of fairness, together with careful charge-screening, can do much to 
reduce delay. Tis is true in general, but it is particularly salient in the current 
context, when trial delay is an especially grave concern. 
Turning to the justice system more broadly, delay can be reduced by 
creative, proactive investment in new technologies and procedures designed to 
enable remote case management, disclosure, and appearances. In a recent series 
of interviews, Canadian Lawyer magazine canvassed the chief justices of several 
trial courts to learn about local responses to COVID-19. Teir comments are 
illustrative. Chief Judge Melissa Gillespie of the Provincial Court of British 
Columbia reported that her court used virtual conferencing technology to 
conduct pre-trial conferences for all matters that were set for trial in March to 
June 2020. She identifed further initiatives that would be helpful if implemented, 
including e-fling, systems to facilitate the fling of exhibits and other documents 
56. See e.g. Olivia Stefanovich, “Chief Justice Wagner denies crossing a line by suggesting 
Criminal Code changes,” CBC News (18 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ 
stefanovich-criminal-defence-lawyers-concerns-post-pandemic-1.5615924> [perma.cc/ 
JLU4-7PXX]. Stefanovich quotes Toronto-based criminal defence lawyer Adam Boni, 
stating: “Te Crown attorney has tremendous power to relieve backlogs through judicious, 
reasonable, vigorous use of discretion” (ibid). 
57. It is essential that Crown attorneys engaged in settlement negotiations prioritize fairness over 
efciency. Tey must be alive to the risk of coerced guilty pleas, particularly given that some 
accused may be tempted to plead guilty to avoid ongoing trial delay. See R v Myers, 2019 
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during virtual hearings, greater access to technology for members of the public, 
and legislative revisions to reduce in-person requirements.58 
Chief Judge Terrence Matchett of the Provincial Court of Alberta described a 
pilot project whereby various types of court appearances are conducted remotely 
through videoconferencing. He reported that his court had held a few criminal 
trials in this manner, and that it was moving towards hearing out-of-custody 
guilty pleas by videoconference or telephone. He identifed the need for greater 
investment in technology as the court’s biggest challenge, citing a need for more 
hardware, IT support, and Wi-Fi access.59 Similarly, Chief Justice Jacques Fournier 
of the Superior Court of Québec described a rollout of virtual courtrooms in 
that province. He observed that the expansion of videoconferencing has taken 
time, and that the expanded use of efciency-promoting technologies “should 
have been done before” the pandemic. He commented, further, on the need for 
lawyers to work together to resolve as many cases as possible.60 
In June 2020, the Chief Justice of Canada (acting in his capacity as co-chair 
of the Action Committee on Court Operations in Response to COVID-19 
alongside Justice Minister David Lametti) reported that that committee was 
considering various strategies in the course of developing national guidelines 
to promote safety and efciency as courts reopen. Strategies reportedly under 
consideration included Criminal Code amendments to facilitate the adducing 
of evidence through video conferencing, and to allow judges to hear cases in 
diferent regional jurisdictions, among others.61 
58. Elizabeth Raymer, “B.C. Provincial Court’s pre-trial conferences have resolved multiple 
matters before trial,” Canadian Lawyer (16 June 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag. 
com/news/general/b.c.-provincial-courts-pre-trial-conferences-have-resolved-multiple-
matters-before-trial/330581> [perma.cc/XVF6-PX53]. 
59. Elizabeth Raymer, “Alberta’s provincial court is planning expanded WebEx remote capability 
in most locations,” Canadian Lawyer (5 June 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag. 
com/practice-areas/litigation/albertas-provincial-court-is-planning-expanded-webex-remote-
capability-in-most-locations/330299> [perma.cc/TL8F-YRBQ]. 
60. Raymer, “Quebec” supra note 23. 
61. Olivia Stefanovich, “Supreme Court chief justice suggests Criminal Code changes to cut 
into court backlogs,” CBC News (13 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ 
stefanovich-chief-justice-reopening-proposals-1.5604773> [perma.cc/ST9A-MLXC]. 
See also “Terms of Reference, Action Committee on Court Operations in Response to 
COVID-19” (22 May 2020), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/ 
csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/ac-ca/term.html> [perma.cc/4XT3-BF5U]; Department of Justice Canada, 
News Release, “Chief Justice of Canada and Minister of Justice Launch Action Committee 
on Court Operations in Response to COVID-19” (8 May 2020), online: Government of 
Canada <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2020/05/chief-justice-of-canada-and-
minister-of-justice-launch-action-committee-on-court-operations-in-response-to-covid-19. 






We can imagine other potential responses. It is foreseeable that some trials 
will be delayed when participants fail COVID-19 screenings and cannot enter 
courtrooms.62 Under normal circumstances, a participant’s illness is treated as 
a discrete event; but there is a marked diference between delay in a given case 
caused by an ordinary but unanticipated illness, and delay caused by a screening 
procedure that is adopted by the court and will foreseeably lead, on a regular 
basis, to some participants being denied entry to the courthouse—albeit for 
compelling public health reasons. It is likewise foreseeable that some trials may be 
delayed due to participants’ pressing caregiving responsibilities. In both instances, 
justice system actors should be expected to foresee these delays and proactively 
address them. One approach may be for courts to facilitate last-minute virtual 
appearances when individuals are well enough to participate but cannot attend 
in-person. Tis method could be utilized on a consent basis, to account for the fact 
that some parties may reasonably prefer to accept delay rather than proceeding 
remotely. In addition to enabling participation from people who fail COVID-19 
screenings, virtual hearings might be more manageable for some participants 
who are balancing caregiving responsibilities, particularly if those hearings are 
conducted with due fexibility and understanding—though for many, of course, 
more meaningful caregiving support is desperately needed.63 Te bottom-line is 
that a lot of the delay associated with COVID-19 is systemic in nature, even if 
it resembles case-specifc delay: it is foreseeable on a general level, and it can be 
reduced in the aggregate through reasonable, proactive institutional responses. 
At the same time, some of the types of COVID delay canvassed in Part 
I, above, could also be addressed by case-specifc Crown responses, in addition 
to institutional responses. Tus, for example, where a trial date needs to be 
rescheduled because a participant fails a COVID-19 screening, the Crown can 
seek the earliest possible date. Te Crown’s ofce can likewise take steps to ensure 
that, if an individual Crown attorney anticipates being unable to attend court 
regularly due to extraordinary caregiving responsibilities, other colleagues take 
html> [perma.cc/CVZ5-4VJX]. As of this writing, the recommendations have not 
been made public. 
62. See supra note 33. 
63. Welcoming participants to the frst virtual Supreme Court of Canada hearing, Chief 
Justice Wagner said, in part: “Tere will be hiccups and maybe even unexpected visits by 
children and pets. Tis is OK. Tere are things that are beyond our control.” See Adrian 
Humphreys, “‘Nothing is perfect the frst time’: Supreme Court’s frst hearing on Zoom 
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carriage of that Crown’s fles. Other case-specifc steps available to Crowns that 
could reduce COVID delay include consenting if the accused seeks to re-elect 
trial by judge alone, per section 472(1) of the Criminal Code,64 so as to avoid the 
additional delay associated with jury trials in the COVID context; developing 
and following concrete plans to minimize delay in cases impacted by COVID; 
and taking a proactive, collaborative approach at pretrial conferences. 
With the foregoing in mind, let us return to the second prong of the 
exceptional circumstances inquiry, which queries whether the Crown and the 
criminal justice system took reasonable steps to avoid the complained-of delay. 
As we have just seen, some of the steps that may be helpful are case-specifc 
and can therefore be assessed through the usual Jordan analysis. But, many of 
the steps available to Crowns and to other criminal justice system actors to 
reduce COVID delay are systemic in nature. Some of these are more ambitious, 
such as Criminal Code amendments. Others are more immediately attainable, 
like the implementation of more selective charge screening criteria. Some steps 
have already been taken, but with room for expansion. Many were urged years 
ago, including by the Jordan Court itself. Indeed, a Senate Committee Report 
published in 2017, which has been cited by the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
section 11(b) jurisprudence, ventured multiple suggestions, many of which are 
now being repeated in the COVID context.65 Among them: comprehensive 
Criminal Code review; improving case management; facilitating guilty pleas 
through fair practices, including the provision of transparent information about 
the Crown’s sentencing position; standardizing e-disclosure; and expanding the 
use of technology. 
In light of the foregoing, it would not be plausible for a Crown to assert, in any 
individual case, that COVID delay could not have been mitigated by reasonable 
steps. Put somewhat diferently, it is far from self-evident that the second prong 
of the exceptional circumstances analysis will be satisfed in any given case, and 
hence it requires a focused assessment. Te trouble is that the systemic steps 
that could reasonably limit COVID delay would be difcult, if not impossible, 
for trial judges to critically assess. Tis is so for myriad reasons, including the 
unavailability of data; the elusiveness of workable standards against which to 
64. Criminal Code, supra note 7. 
65. Canada, Delaying Justice is Denying Justice: An Urgent Need to Address Lengthy Court Delays in 
Canada (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Afairs, 2017), 
online (pdf ): <sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/LCJC/reports/Court_Delays_ 
Final_Report_e.pdf> [perma.cc/YC2N-N9US] [Canada, Delaying Justice is Denying Justice]. 
Te report was cited in R v KGK, supra note 36; R v KJM, supra note 42. 













measure institutional responses; the need to keep section 11(b) procedures 
relatively streamlined; and the separation of powers, which imposes limitations 
on the judicial scrutiny of legislative and executive decision making. It is one 
thing, for example, to assess “whether the Crown, having initiated what could 
reasonably be expected to be a complex prosecution, developed and followed a 
concrete plan to minimize the delay occasioned by such complexity” as mandated 
by Jordan; 66 but it is quite another to evaluate whether the Crown was guided 
by an appropriate charge-screening policy. Even if Crowns were willing and able 
to put ofcewide policies on the record—which is by no means a given—courts 
would not be able to evaluate their sufciency without identifying appropriate 
standards and comparators, and without trenching on prosecutorial discretion.67 
Further, any attempt to engage in this sort of analysis would complicate and 
extend section 11(b) proceedings at a time when it is particularly vital that those 
proceedings be conducted efciently. In mid-August, the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice amended its Provincial Practice Direction to, among other 
things, streamline section 11(b) applications, including by putting presumptive 
caps on the court time that can be dedicated to them.68 In this practice context, 
any variations to the section 11(b) standard that would signifcantly increase its 
complexity are untenable. 
C. CONTRASTING THE TRANSITIONAL EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE 
WITH THE COVID CONTEXT 
To be sure, generalized policies and practices impact the timelines of all criminal 
trials, not just those afected by COVID-19. Yet, when applying the Jordan 
framework in the ordinary course, judges need not consider general policies. 
Te analysis works, not because the framework disregards systemic conduct, but 
because it assesses that conduct indirectly, through the presumptive ceilings. Te 
Jordan majority expressly intended the ceilings to motivate institutional reform: 
66. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 79. 
67. Te Court has made clear that trial judges should not interpolate themselves in exercises 
of prosecutorial discretion when applying section 11(b); but, “[w]hile the court plays no 
supervisory role for such decisions, Crown counsel must be alive to the fact that any delay 
resulting from their prosecutorial discretion must conform to the accused’s s. 11(b) right” 
(Jordan, supra note 2 at para 79). See also Tanabalasingham, supra note 46 at para 5. 
Exercises of prosecutorial discretion are subject to very minimal judicial scrutiny, in light of 
concerns about the separation of powers. See e.g. R v Anderson, 2014 SCC 41. 
68. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Provincial Practice Direction/Amendment to the 
Criminal Proceedings Rules Regarding Criminal Proceedings” (12 August 2020), online: 
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“A presumptive ceiling is required in order to give meaningful direction to the 
state on its constitutional obligations and to those who play an important role 
in ensuring that the trial concludes within a reasonable time … .”69 Te ceiling 
both spurs and guides criminal justice actors, serving as a metric by which their 
eforts can be evaluated. If a trial takes longer than eighteen or thirty months, 
as the case may be, and if the above-ceiling delay is not attributed to the defence 
and/or exceptional circumstances, then by process of elimination, it must be 
due to unreasonable Crown conduct, systemic delay, or both. As such, it cannot 
be justifed. Tus, the Jordan framework does account for systemic eforts to 
promote trial efciency, but it does not require judges to evaluate institutional 
policies and practices. 
In the COVID context, the ceilings cannot serve as an indirect means of 
assessing systemic eforts to manage trial delay. Tis is so because, by their very 
nature, discrete systemwide events like COVID-19 upend the system, such that 
whatever policies and practices were in place to manage systemic delay prior to 
the discrete systemwide event are rendered inadequate or inapposite. Discrete 
systemwide events necessitate new, diferent approaches to managing systemic 
delay, which take time to implement. 
When the Jordan majority established the ceilings, it did not expect 
criminal justice actors to get systemic delay in check instantly. It established the 
“transitional exceptional circumstance” so that cases already in the system when 
Jordan was decided would be assessed “contextually” in light of the pre-Jordan case 
law that guided the parties at the operative time, and with some forbearance for 
the systemic delay issues that characterized the pre-Jordan era. In efect, criminal 
justice actors were granted a time-limited period to improve institutional delay. 
Following the logic of the transitional exception, one could suggest that 
courts should recognize a new, higher ceiling to account for COVID delay that 
would apply temporarily and would account for the time required to implement 
institutional responses to COVID-19. Tere are, however, at least three problems 
with this suggestion. First, the Court has indicated a reticence to complicate 
the Jordan framework by introducing multiple ceilings.70 Second, whereas the 
transitional exceptional circumstance was confned to a limited time period 
that was both unambiguous and non-arbitrary, it is not obvious how we could 
sensibly delineate a temporary exception for COVID-19: At what point do we 
expect institutional actors to have re-established equilibrium, particularly since 
the pandemic may ebb and fow in the foreseeable future? Tird, the parties’ 
69. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 50. 
70. R v KJM, supra note 42. 










conduct between the time when COVID delay became an issue, and the time 
the new ceiling would be announced, would have to be evaluated with reference 
to a retroactive standard. Te transitional exception worked because the parties’ 
conduct during the period to which it applied could be evaluated according to 
the standards that governed at that time. Tere is no analogous set of shared 
expectations that has been guiding criminal justice actors in the frst months of 
the pandemic. Te transitional exception is of modest assistance, since it provides 
some authority for the proposition that as time passes, we can expect more efective 
institutional responses. Beyond that, it is of little help for present purposes. 
At the end of the day, the Jordan framework assumes systemic eforts to 
reduce delay will be accounted for by the section 11(b) analysis, but it does not 
make space for such an assessment in the context of a discrete systemwide event 
like COVID-19. As a result, we are caught between two untenable positions: 
require Crowns to fully satisfy both prongs of the exceptional circumstances 
analysis, including by showing that reasonable eforts were made on a systemic 
level to reduce COVID delay, despite the fact that courts cannot realistically be 
expected to adjudicate this issue; or, efectively declaw the second prong of the 
analysis, even though doing so would informally relieve the Crown of much of 
its burden while allowing some accused persons to sufer avoidable, unreasonably 
protracted trial delay with no remedy. Neither position is acceptable. We need to 
navigate between them by developing a novel approach. 
III. RESPONDING TO COVID DELAY WITH SENTENCING 
REDUCTIONS 
Te frst step of developing a novel approach is identifying those cases to which 
it would apply. In below-ceiling cases marked by COVID delay, the standards 
are unchanged, since the exceptional circumstances analysis is not implicated.71 
71. COVID delay could potentially inform the below-ceiling analysis, but its role in that analysis 
is far less obvious than in the above-ceiling cases. Te assessment for below-ceiling delay 
is somewhat more elastic and takes into account Crown conduct, among other factors, 
to decide whether the case took “markedly longer than it reasonably should have” (Jordan, 
supra note 2 at para 48). Te defence bears the onus, and it must also show that it took 
“meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained efort to expedite the proceedings” (ibid). 
In the COVID context, the defence could perhaps argue that the case took markedly longer 
than it should have due to institutional and individual failures to respond to COVID delay, 
but this argument would likely be a difcult one to mount, given the Court’s admonishment 
that “stays beneath the ceiling [are expected] to be rare, and limited to clear cases” (ibid). 
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For above-ceiling cases, we should begin, as usual, by calculating the total period 
of delay, excluding any defence delay. We should then subtract any delay that 
is attributable to exceptional circumstances and is not COVID-19-related; any 
COVID delay that occurred may or may not need to be specifcally addressed, 
depending on how the rest of the analysis plays out, and so there is no need to 
take it up just yet. If the remaining total period of delay is below the ceiling, 
then the delay is presumptively reasonable, irrespective of how the COVID delay 
is treated; hence, the standards for below-ceiling delay can apply as usual, and 
there is no need to address whether the COVID delay ought to be deducted as 
an exceptional circumstance. If the remaining total period of delay is above the 
ceiling, then the next question is whether it would still be above the ceiling were 
the COVID delay subtracted as an exceptional circumstance. If the answer is 
yes, then once again, the COVID delay is not determinative: Te total period of 
delay is presumptively unreasonable in any event, and since it cannot be justifed 
using the exceptional circumstances analysis no matter how the COVID delay is 
treated, a stay should follow. If the answer is no, then the COVID delay may be 
determinative, and its status must be specifcally addressed. 
In cases where the COVID delay is determinative, the defence should be 
allowed to take the position that, even if the COVID delay were discounted 
entirely, such that the total period of delay would fall below the ceiling, that delay 
would still be unreasonable under the usual Jordan standard. If the defence can 
demonstrate that a section 11(b) violation occurred, irrespective of the COVID 
delay, then a stay is warranted. Where the defence does not take this position, 
it will be necessary to confront the COVID delay directly. At this juncture, 
it is appropriate to frst consider whether the Crown took, or ought to have 
taken, reasonably available case-specifc steps to manage COVID delay, examples 
of which were canvassed in Part II(B)(2), above. To the extent that the Crown 
failed to take reasonably available case-specifc steps, the resultant delay cannot 
satisfy the exceptional circumstances test, and so it should attract a stay. Tis 
result follows from the standard Jordan framework and does not turn on how we 
address the problem of accounting for systemwide responses to COVID delay. 
pandemic should be expressly accounted for in the below-ceiling analysis. Tis argument 
could be advanced on the basis of the Court’s holding in R v KJM that “[i]n youth cases, the 
enhanced need for timeliness in youth matters should be included as another factor to be 
considered in determining the reasonable time requirements of a particular case” (supra note 
42 at para 71). Arguably, like youth, accused persons held on remand during the pandemic 
are a readily identifed group for whom trial delay is (or should be) recognized as especially 
prejudicial. See text accompanying notes 100-02. 










Once these analytic steps have been exhausted, we are left with those cases 
in which the COVID delay is determinative and could not reasonably have been 
avoided by case-specifc steps. For these residual cases, the problem of accounting 
for systemwide responses to COVID delay cannot be avoided: Te section 11(b) 
analysis should turn on the question of whether the delay would have breached 
the ceiling had the Crown and the criminal justice system taken reasonably 
available steps, on a systemwide level, to reduce trial delay. As we have seen, 
however, that question is resistant to analysis under the Jordan framework. 
One could take the position that, in these cases, the section 11(b) challenge 
should succeed: Te Crown cannot discharge its burden, and so the presumption 
of unreasonableness prevails. Te problem is that, if this position were adopted, 
it could result in large numbers of charges being stayed because of the pandemic. 
Te Jordan Court made it very clear that the system cannot countenance staying 
massive numbers of cases because of delay, and that this result would damage the 
repute of the administration of justice.72 Justice Minister Lametti announced that 
Parliament would consider intervening to prevent it from occurring.73 As such, 
an argument for staying cases whenever COVID delay is determinative departs 
from some of the commitments that animate Jordan, and in any event, it would 
almost certainly be rejected in practice. I have argued that the opposite extreme— 
simply eschewing a meaningful assessment and thereby denying section 11(b) 
claims when COVID delay is determinative—must likewise be rejected as both 
unjust and inconsistent with Jordan. Tat approach makes the accused whose 
Charter right is at issue bear the cost of the Charter framework’s defciency. 
In sum, then, insisting on a stay where the Crown cannot practicably discharge 
its burden is at best unrealistic, while denying a remedy when the Crown has not 
actually discharged its burden is unjust. What, then, is the solution? 
We can avoid the two extremes by granting an alternative remedy, namely a 
sentencing reduction, in cases where COVID delay is determinative. Admittedly, 
this solution is imperfect. A sentencing reduction does nothing for accused 
persons who are acquitted after lengthy delays. It may be of limited value in 
cases involving mandatory minimum sentences. It arguably reduces the value 
of the accused’s section 11(b) right. Yet, it achieves a more nuanced result than 
the alternatives, and it does so while remaining relatively straightforward to 
apply—an important consideration, given the ambitions of the Jordan Court to 
72. Jordan, supra note 2 at para 94. 
73. Olivia Stefanovich, “Justice minister says he’s ready to legislate if pandemic delays lead 
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streamline the section 11(b) standard, and the particular need to avoid lengthy 
section 11(b) proceedings at a time when courts will predictably be overwhelmed. 
Two doctrinal paths lead to this pragmatic solution. One cuts through the 
section 11(b) jurisprudence to establish sentencing reductions as a remedy for 
unreasonable trial delay authorized by section 24(1) of the Charter. Te other 
takes a detour around the section 11(b) jurisprudence by making COVID delay a 
mitigating factor under the sentencing analysis mandated by the Criminal Code.74 
I will map both paths in turn. 
A. SENTENCING REDUCTIONS UNDER THE CHARTER 
Te governing section 11(b) case law identifes a stay of proceedings as the only 
available remedy for unconstitutional trial delay. Tis is so despite the fexibility 
suggested by section 24(1) of the Charter, which authorizes remedies for Charter 
violations.75 Te holding that all section 11(b) violations automatically require 
a stay of proceedings was arrived at in 1987 in R v Rahey,76 which reversed the 
Court’s decision in R v Mills, issued the previous year.77 Rahey was decided by 
a bench of eight justices, six of whom concurred that a stay is the only suitable 
remedy because, in efect, once an accused has been subjected to unreasonable 
trial delay, anything short of staying the proceedings will exacerbate the Charter 
violation. Four of the justices also stated that a stay of proceedings must follow 
because, when a section 11(b) breach occurs, the court loses its jurisdiction to 
proceed78—though this analysis did not ultimately gain much traction.79 
74. Criminal Code, supra note 7, ss 718-718.2. 
75. See Charter, supra note 1, s 24(1). Section 24(1) states: “(1) Anyone whose rights or 
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court 
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just 
in the circumstances” (ibid). 
76. Rahey, supra note 35. 
77. R v Mills, [1986] 1 SCR 863 at 965-66. 
78. Ibid at 889, Dickson CJ, Lamer J (Justice Estey and Justice Wilson concurring on this point). 
79. Christopher Sherrin, “Reconsidering the Charter Remedy for Unreasonable Delay in 
Criminal Cases” (2016) 20 CCLR 263 at 271 (“Te claim did not truly amount to an 
additional justifcation for the chosen remedy of a stay. It was really nothing more than 
an assertion made in the course of articulating the argument [that a lesser remedy would 
exacerbate the Charter breach]. Te claim also never attracted support from a majority 
of the Court,” ibid, n 52) [Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay”]. See also Andrew Pilla & Levi 
Vandersteen, “Re-Charting the Remedial Course for Section 11(b) Violations Post-Jordan” 
(2020) 56 Osgoode Hall LJ 436 at 450-51. But see R v Hartling, 2020 ONCA 243 at para 
112 [Hartling]. 














Te decision in Rahey to limit the section 11(b) remedy has long been 
controversial,80 and the Court has signaled a willingness to reconsider it.81 
Christopher Sherrin has persuasively argued that Rahey’s core rationale—that 
continuing the trial will exacerbate the violation—has “superfcial appeal but 
ultimately collapses on closer scrutiny. It incorrectly assumes that the problem 
is delay in and of itself, when the problem is actually the efects of delay on 
constitutionally protected interests.”82 Sherrin points out that if another remedy 
were adequate to address the harms associated with trial delay—namely, 
prejudice to liberty, security of the person, and/or trial fairness—then that other 
remedy would sufce. Other scholars agree that Rahey should be overturned, 
citing theoretical and pragmatic reasons, including a concern that the extreme 
remedy makes courts less likely to fnd a violation. 83 Te aforementioned 
Senate Committee Report likewise recommended expanding the remedies for 
unreasonable trial delay.84 
Others have argued for the status quo.85 Te Criminal Lawyers’ Association 
(CLA) recently defended Rahey in an intervenor brief before the Court.86 It made 
three points of note. First, it argued that the threat of a stay motivates criminal 
justice actors to promote trial efciency. Second, it urged that introducing 
more remedies would “create precisely the litigation uncertainty that Jordan was 
trying to eliminate” while reintroducing the focus on individual prejudice that 
was disavowed in Jordan. Finally, it argued that the rest of the section 11(b) 
80. Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay,” supra note 79. 
81. Jordan, supra note 2 (“We were not invited to revisit the question of remedy. Accordingly, 
we refrain from doing so” at para 35, n 1). 
82. Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay,” supra note 79 at 264. 
83. See Pilla & Vandersteen, supra note 79; Honourable Marc Rosenberg, “Twenty-Five Years 
Later: Te Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the Criminal Law” 
(2009) 45 SCLR (2d) 233; Colin Wood, “Te Infexible Stay of Proceedings: Alternative 
Remedies for Charter for Section 11(b) Breaches” (2016) 2 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 
80; Daved Muttart, “Section 11(b): A Case of the Trees Blocking LaForest” (2017) 64 Crim 
LQ 173; Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Tomsen Reuters, 2019) 
at 9.1050-9.1170; Justice Chris de Sa, “Understanding R v Jordan: A New Era for Section 
11(b)” (2018) 66 Crim LQ 93. 
84. Canada, Delaying Justice Is Denying Justice, supra note 65 at 36-40. 
85. See e.g. Keara Lundrigan, “R v Jordan: A Ticking Time Bomb” (2018) 41 Man LJ 113. 
86. KGK v Her Majesty the Queen, 2020 SCC 7 (Factum of the Intervener, 
Criminal Lawyers’ Association Ontario), online (pdf ): <www.scc-csc.ca/ 
WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38532/FM060_Intervener_Criminal-Lawyers’-
Association-(Ontario).pdf> [perma.cc/DC69-996G] [CLA Factum] (Te section 11(b) 
remedy was raised for the frst time by the respondent on fnal appeal and was not taken 
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caselaw—which is “parsimonious in defning the contours of what constitutes a 
breach”—has been calibrated to the current remedy.87 
For present purposes, I do not take a position on whether the section 11(b) 
remedy should be revised in general; my concern is limited to whether and how 
a lesser remedy could be applied in cases involving COVID delay. I agree with 
Sherrin that it is not intrinsically unjust or illogical to grant a lesser remedy for 
section 11(b), since the harm to be redressed is not the delay per se, but the 
prejudice irrebuttably associated with that delay. I recognize, however, that one 
could subscribe to this view while also accepting the CLA’s arguments for limiting 
the section 11(b) remedy, at least so long as the Jordan framework governs. If one 
accepts, as I do, that there is no intrinsic problem with establishing sentencing 
reductions as a remedy for trial delay, then one could take the position that 
sentencing reductions are an appropriate section 11(b) remedy for cases where 
COVID delay is determinative.88 Tis position would not be incompatible with 
the belief that, in all other cases where a more refned application of the Jordan 
framework is possible, the only available remedy should be a stay. Ultimately, the 
difculty with the argument is that, while it fnds some indirect support in recent 
Court of Appeal for Ontario jurisprudence, it is hard to square with Rahey. 
In R v Charley and R v Hartling, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered 
the appropriate remedy for unreasonable delay occurring at the sentencing 
phase.89 Te court did not fnd itself to be bound by Rahey, since a conviction is 
not tainted by a section 11(b) Charter breach occurring at the post-verdict stage, 
and so it is not necessary to stay that conviction.90 In Charley, the court left the 
matter of remedy unsettled, having found no section 11(b) violation. In Hartling, 
it ultimately determined that staying a conviction because the sentencing process 
took too long “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute,” yet a 
remedy was warranted, since the delay prejudiced the accused and undermined 
87. Ibid at paras 19-21. Te CLA also endorsed the rationale in Rahey. CLA Factum, supra
note 86 at para 19. 
88. Tere is no reason in principle why, if a section 11(b) violation at the trial phase could be 
remedied by a sentencing reduction, it could not also be remedied in other ways. Indeed, 
Sherrin has proposed a variety of remedies tailored to the particular harms to be addressed. 
Sherrin, “Unreasonable Delay,” supra note 79. Tis more nuanced approach is, of course, 
more consistent with the critique of Rahey, which seeks to shift our focus on the discrete 
harms associated with trial delay. For present purposes, I have nevertheless embraced a 
blunter analysis, which is simpler to apply—an important consideration at a time when 
courts will be especially inundated. 
89. R v Charley, 2019 ONCA 726 [Charley]; Hartling, supra note 79. 
90. Hartling, supra note 79 at para 113; Charley, supra note 89 at paras 107-09. Cf R v 
Croteau, 2020 ONCJ 55. 














broader social interests. It concluded the delay should be addressed at sentencing 
and “should result in enhanced mitigation.”91 
Drawing on this analysis, one could argue that cases involving COVID delay 
require a similar balancing: On the one hand, it would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute to stay those cases across the board, particularly if there 
were no meaningful opportunity for the Crown to show that the delay was 
justifed; but on the other hand, COVID delay causes real harm that warrants a 
remedy. To be sure, the doctrinal analysis in Charley and Hartling does not apply 
directly to current circumstances, since that analysis hinged on the distinction 
between pre- and post-verdict delay, whereas the COVID delay cases will mostly 
be cases involving pre-verdict trial delay. Te broader theme of Charley and 
Hartling, however, is that a principled analysis is required in cases where issuing 
a stay is untenable but declining to fnd a section 11(b) violation is unjust, and 
that analysis can ultimately support an alternative section 11(b) Charter remedy. 
Still, while this analysis is compelling on its own terms, as applied to the COVID 
context, it whistles past Rahey. It is therefore unlikely to be accepted unless Rahey
is overturned or distinguished. 
B. SENTENCING REDUCTIONS UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE 
If sentencing reductions cannot be achieved through the Charter, they can 
nevertheless be aforded through the usual sentencing process, per the Court’s 
unanimous reasons in Nasogaluak.92 In that case, the Court recognized that 
extended trial delay can justify a lower sentence, whether or not it rises to the 
level of a Charter breach: 93 
[T]he sentencing regime provides some scope for sentencing judges to consider 
not only the actions of the ofender, but also those of state actors. Where the state 
misconduct in question relates to the circumstances of the ofence or the ofender, 
the sentencing judge may properly take the relevant facts into account in crafting a 
ft sentence, without having to resort to s. 24(1) of the Charter. 
More particularly, state misconduct can factor into sentencing via the 
proportionality analysis mandated by section 718.1 of the Criminal Code. 
A proportionate sentence “expresses, to some extent, society’s legitimate 
shared values and concerns”—including the values enshrined in the Charter.94 
If impugned state conduct relates to the ofender and to the circumstances of the 
91. Hartling, supra note 79 at para 119. 
92. Nasogaluak, supra note 7 at para 3. 
93. Ibid at para 2. 
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ofence, then accounting for it at sentencing gives expression to Charter values 
and thereby advances the sentencing principle of proportionality. 
Te Court afrmed that “a sentence can be reduced in light of state 
misconduct even when the incidents complained of do not rise to the level of a 
Charter breach,” and it cited several examples, including cases in which excessive 
trial delay falling below the section 11(b) threshold was treated as a mitigating 
factor.95 In one of those cases, R v Bosley, Justice Doherty observed that “excessive 
delay which causes prolonged uncertainty for the appellant but does not reach 
constitutional limits can be taken into consideration as a factor in mitigation of 
sentence.”96 COVID delay will, in many cases, cause “prolonged uncertainty” 
and other manifest harms to the accused. Indeed, where the total period of delay 
surpasses the Jordan ceiling, harm can be presumed. Further, there is no issue as 
to the nexus between any state misconduct giving rise to extended delay and the 
circumstances of the ofender. Te less obvious point, for present purposes, is that 
COVID delay can be attributed to “state misconduct.” 
Te term “misconduct” can suggest abuse or impropriety by one or more 
individual state actors, as was the case in Nasogaluak itself, where the accused was 
injured by excessive police force and then left without medical treatment. It can 
also apply to more impersonal, less dramatic encroachments on Charter-protected 
interests, however. Te excessive delay cases cited by the Nasogaluak Court 
prove the point. In Bosley, for example, the excessive delay at issue was mostly 
characterized as “institutional delay” and mainly stemmed from the trial judge’s 
inability to take sufcient time away from his other institutional duties to craft his 
reasons.97 In another cited case, R v Leaver, the unacceptable delay was attributed 
to “unsatisfactory” court scheduling practices.98 Tus, COVID delay could entitle 
an accused to a sentencing remedy under Nasogaluak to the extent that it refects 
systemic delay. COVID delay does indeed refect systemic delay. If nothing else, 
many of the strategies that could have meaningfully reduced COVID delay from 
the outset, such as greater technological investment, were touted long before 
the pandemic. Tey were pushed by various stakeholders and commentators, 
including the Senate Committee and the Jordan Court itself. In this light, 
it is not a stretch to say that, even if the failure to implement those strategies is 
95. Ibid at para 53, citing R v Bosley, [1992] 18 CR (4th) 347 (Ont CA) [Bosley], R v Leaver 
(1996), 3 CR (5th) 138 (Ont CA) [Leaver], and R v Panousis, 2002 ABQB 1109 (reversed by 
2004 ABCA 211). 
96. Supra note 95. 
97. Ibid. 
98. Leaver, supra note 95 at para 2. 










not enough to ground a section 11(b) violation, it is sufcient to justify treating 
COVID delay as a mitigating factor at sentencing under Nasogaluak. 
Quite apart from the fact that COVID delay can plausibly be attributed 
to “misconduct,” the broader principle expressed in Nasogaluak is instructive. 
Nasogaluak recognizes that a proportionate sentence is one that balances and 
expresses the diferent values that animate our criminal justice system, and which 
relate to the experience of the individual ofender. When crafting a proportionate 
sentence, judges are expected to account for the diferent ways in which the 
criminal justice process has subjected the accused to harshness and deprivation, 
in order to ensure that the sum total of the accused’s experience culminating 
in the actual sentence will not be disproportionately harsh. Te sentencing 
assessment therefore accounts for such things as the hardship of pretrial detention, 
and the harms occasioned by collateral consequences arising out of the ofence 
or the prosecution.99 Even if COVID delay is not attributed to misconduct, 
it is nevertheless a hardship that relates directly to the ofender’s Charter-protected 
rights. It should be considered as a mitigating factor at sentencing. 
C. CALCULATING THE SENTENCING REDUCTION 
If a sentencing reduction is to apply—either as a remedy for a section 11(b) 
violation, or because COVID delay is a mitigating factor at sentencing—then 
it will of course be necessary to calculate that reduction. It is not possible to 
ofer a general formula: “As with mitigating circumstances generally, there can 
be no automatic or formulaic calculation of the reduction in sentence. … Te 
jurisprudence will—as always—develop with each case determined on its own 
particular facts, considering the ofence, the ofender, the length of the delay, the 
circumstances of the delay and any other relevant factors.”100 Tere are, however, 
a few general considerations that may be of assistance, beyond the basic principle 
that the specifc circumstances of the case must of course inform how COVID 
delay should be weighted within the proportionality analysis. 
First, as we have seen, the transitional exception suggests that, once the 
criminal justice system is on notice that institutional responses to trial delay 
are required, we can expect those responses to improve over time. By the same 
token, as more time passes, inadequate systemic responses are more deserving of 
censure. To the extent that the purpose of the sentencing reduction is to afrm 
Charter values, it therefore makes sense to aford a more generous reduction the 
99. R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14 at para 8; R v Suter, 2018 SCC 34. 
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further we get from March 2020, when the criminal justice system became fully 
aware of the need to manage COVID delay. 
Second, since the sentencing reduction is meant to redress harms to the 
accused, it should also be informed by a high-level assessment of the harms 
that a particular accused experienced. Te heightened prejudice associated 
with pretrial detention is especially relevant. It has long been understood that 
pretrial detention is prejudicial, but this is especially so in the current context. 
COVID-19 can spread rapidly in jails, where conditions make social distancing 
and recommended hygiene practices virtually impossible to implement.101 Eforts 
to prevent its spread have resulted in further restrictions on incarcerated persons, 
who may be confned to their cells for longer stretches to limit exposure.102 Te 
result is that jails are even harsher and more dangerous than usual. In suggesting 
that harms occasioned by delay should be factored into the analysis—including, 
but not limited to, the prejudice associated with pretrial detention—I am 
mindful of the fact that the Jordan majority sought to streamline matters by 
eliminating the assessment of individual prejudice. Jordan does not, however, 
purport to apply to criminal sentencing. Tat said, the imperative of keeping 
processes within a manageable scope operates in both contexts. Te best 
approach, therefore, is likely one that accounts for prejudice in a pixilated fashion 
by looking at general indicators like whether the accused was held in pretrial 
detention during the pandemic. In addition, while evidence of specifc prejudice 
may entitle the accused to a more signifcant sentencing reduction, it should 
not be regarded as a precondition to one, since any protracted trial delay is 
understood to be prejudicial. 
Tird, COVID-19 can warrant sentencing reductions for reasons other 
than trial delay. Accused persons may, for example, receive enhanced pretrial 
credit given the particular harshness of pretrial detention during the pandemic. 
Likewise, there is now some precedent for imposing quantitively lower criminal 
sentences during the pandemic, since COVID-19 makes custodial sentences 
qualitatively harsher.103 Because these various sentencing reductions address 
diferent issues, they should be counted separately and cumulatively. 
101. See e.g. Simon Lewsen, “Social Distancing Is Impossible in Prisons. Why Are Tey Still Full?” 
Te Walrus (12 May 2020), online: <thewalrus.ca/social-distancing-is-impossible-in-prisons-
why-are-they-still-full> [perma.cc/D39Y-NWDK]. 
102. Valérie Ouellet & Joseph Loiero, “COVID-19 taking a toll in prisons, with high infection 
rates, CBC News analysis shows,” CBC News (17 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/ 
canada/prisons-jails-inmates-covid-19-1.5652470> [perma.cc/AQ85-QJUJ]. 
103. See e.g. R v Stevens, 2020 BCPC 104; R v Studd, 2020 ONSC 2810; R v Hearns, 2020 
ONSC 2365; cf R v Rich, [2020] NJ No 90 (Prov Ct). 








A fnal caveat. My argument for afording a lesser remedy for COVID delay 
responds to the particularities of discrete systemwide events; it is not an argument 
for reducing section 11(b) remedies across the board. In this connection, 
it is important to underscore that discrete systemwide events are vanishingly rare. 
We could perhaps imagine a scenario in which resources were diverted away from 
the criminal justice system to respond to some exigency, but where the pressure 
on the criminal justice system resulted solely from that budgetary decision. 
In other words, we can imagine an emergency situation having an indirect efect 
on trial delay. Tis scenario should not count as a discrete systemwide event. 
Te core message of Jordan is that, if we are going to prosecute people, we must 
invest enough to do so in a Charter-compliant fashion. Nothing in the present 
analysis would support state ofcials diverting resources away from the criminal 
justice system, even for a compelling reason, and then arguing that the resulting 
trial delays should attract lesser remedies as a result of that choice to deprioritize 
criminal court operations. 
In short, adopting the proposed solution for addressing COVID delay 
within the Jordan framework would not impact the majority of section 11(b) 
cases. Tere is no logical or practical impediment to implementing it while 
also maintaining that any case which is not impacted by a discrete systemwide 
event—that is, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases—should be decided 
under the received Jordan framework, and should only be remedied by a stay of 
proceedings if a section 11(b) violation is established. Te notion that we should 
adopt an alternative remedy for excessive trial delay may look like a signifcant 
departure from our existing section 11(b) standards, but my suggestion is that 
we apply that remedy surgically, in response to a problem that is both sui generis 
and acute, and in a context wherein the only realistic alternative is to provide 
no remedy at all. Once we accept that the Jordan framework cannot account 
for delay caused by discrete systemwide events like COVID-19, we see that 
varying the framework in these cases is hardly a radical step—or in any event, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault considers various measures of state 
control introduced in response to the plague in late seventeenth-century France. 
He contrasts what he calls the “whole literary fction of the festival [that] grew 
up around the plague: suspended laws, lifted prohibitions, the frenzy of passing 
time, bodies mingling together without respect” with “a political dream of 
the plague, which was exactly the reverse: not the collective festival, but strict 
divisions; not laws transgressed, but the penetration of regulation.”104 Tus, 
according to Foucault, a state of emergency caused by a deadly contagion was 
met by two contrasting visions. Te frst was of chaos and lawlessness. In the 
context of section 11(b), this vision is, in essence, the lurid image that invariably 
informs popular discourse about criminal charges being stayed due to trial 
delay: the image of criminals being set free in mockery of the law—as though to 
vindicate an individual’s constitutional rights is not to enforce our most vital and 
foundational law. Foucault’s second vision was of unyielding and proliferating 
state control. It is even more nefarious. It is the fction that, by circumscribing 
individual rights and expanding state power, we can attain normalcy during an 
emergency. In the context of section 11(b), it tells us that, by the stroke of a 
pen and the invocation of “exceptional circumstances,” courts can nullify the 
acute sufering that COVID delay is inficting on accused persons, without 
requiring Crown attorneys to discharge their burden of justifying presumptively 
unreasonable delay. In truth, neither vision is accurate, and neither is desirable. 
We cannot realistically expect courts to simply stay thousands of criminal charges 
because of COVID-19; but neither should we accept that the harm caused to 
accused persons by COVID delay does not merit a remedy. We must navigate 
between these two extremes. 
Tis article has proposed one possible route: Where COVID delay proves 
to be decisive, the accused should be entitled to a sentencing reduction, either 
as a Charter remedy or, more feasibly, through the statutory sentencing process.
Admittedly, resort to a lesser remedy in the face of pervasive uncertainty about 
the merits and structure of a Charter claim is hardly ideal. But, when it comes 
to generating workable, real-time responses to a global pandemic, very little is. 
104. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: Te Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan 
(Vintage Books, 1975) at 197-98. 

